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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainti ff/Appellee, 
V . 
PAUL LYNN GRINDBERG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.981184-CA 
(Priority No. 3) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-1 and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2)(b) provided 
Mr. Grindberg's right to appeal from the post-judgment order of the trial court affecting his 
substantial rights. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from a district court in a criminal case not involving a first degree felony. 
The trial court signed and filed the order appealed from on March 18,1998 (R. 71), 
and Mr. Grindberg filed a timely notice of appeal on March 26,1998 (R. 74-75). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. PRESERVATION OF ISSUE. 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to rescind its previous order terminating Mr. 
Grindberg's probation? 
Trial counsel did not raise this issue in the trial court. However, because the matter 
involves a flaw in the trial court's jurisdiction, the error is not subject to waiver. See e^ g. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State ex rel. E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, (Utah App. 1991)("[A] jurisdictional defect cannot be 
waived."). 
In raising the issue for the first time on appeal,1 Mr. Grindberg will rely on the plain 
error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
To warrant relief under the plain error doctrine, Grindberg must show that the trial 
court's error should have been plain at the time that it was made, and that the error affected 
Grindberg's substantial rights. See e ^ State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 814(1989). The first requirement, that the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court, can be dispensed with by this Court, to insure that justice is done. 773 P.2d 
at35n.8. 
The relevant standards governing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim are set 
forth in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), as follows: 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must (i) identify 
specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or omission and 
under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel' s error 
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for the error, there is a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant. 
This prejudice test is equivalent to the harmfulness test we apply in 
determining plain error, or reversible error. 
In determining whether counsel's performance is constitutionally deficient, we 
presume that counsel has rendered adequate assistance. Thus, if the 
1
 Mr. Grindberg did raise the issue in a petition for post-conviction relief (R. 81 -
112). However, the trial court ruled that the petition was premature and struck the petition 
pending resolution of this appeal (R. 150-151). 
2 
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challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, we will 
not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel. Moreover, when 
confronted with a claim of ineffective assistance, we may choose not to 
consider the adequacy of counsel's performance if we determine that any 
claimed error was not harmful. 
Id. at 1225 (citations omitted). 
The question before the Court, involving the trial court's authority over probation 
revocation, involves a question of law, to be reviewed without any particular deference. See 
State v. Grate. 947 P.2d 1161. 1164 (Utah App. 1997V 
CONTROLLING STATUTE. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute, rule and constitutional provisions pertain, and are copied in the 
addendum to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, §7 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDING. AND DISPOSITION 
The State of Utah charged Mr. Grindberg by information with possession of a 
dangerous weapon, a third degree felony, possession of a controlled substance, a third 
3 
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degree felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, driving on 
suspension, a class C misdemeanor, driving without headlights, a class C misdemeanor, and 
improper registration, a class C misdemeanor (R. 28). 
The trial court appointed David Perry to represent Grindberg in the trial court (R. 8). 
Grindberg waived the preliminary hearing, and was bound over as charged (R. 28). 
In the district court, Grindberg pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of paraphernalia, and the remaining charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea 
bargain (R. 32, 39). 
On June 17, 1996, Judge Clint S. Judkins sentenced Mr. Grindberg to serve zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison for the conviction of possession of a controlled substance 
and a concurrent term for the conviction of possession of paraphernalia (R. 39-40). He 
suspended the prison sentence and placed Grindberg on probation (R. 39-40). The minute 
entry for the final sentencing hearing indicates in relevant part, 
Court: On possession of a c/s Def to serve not more than 5 yrs USP. Stayed. 
Def placed on probation with APP. To spend indeterminate time CCJ. 
Review after 130 days. Def to receive credit of 10 days towards time. Fine 
$925 incl surcharge. $200 recoupment fee. Def to enroll and complete 
substance abuse counseling at his own expenses. Other standard terms and 
conditions of probation. No alcohol clause. If Def accepted into a program he 
may be released to go to program and receive credit for time served. On the 
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia Def to serve indeterminate time 
CCJ. Same terms [a]nd conditions of probation. Fine $400 including 
surcharge. 
(R. 39-40). 
4 
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The original judgment, sentence and commitment, signed June 20, 1996, listed 
numerous conditions of probation, including, 
1. The Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Cache County Jail for an 
indeterminate period of time, with credit for ten (10) days served. A review 
date will be set after the Defendant has served one-hundred and thirty (130) 
days in the Cache County Jail. The Defendant can enter into an inpatient care 
program after he had served at least sixty (60) days in jail or fifty (50) days 
plus ten (10) days credit for time served. If the defendant is accepted in an 
inpatient care program, the Defendant will be returned to the Cache County 
Jail upon completion of the inpatient care program. 
(R. 65-67). 
On June 27, 1996, Grindberg signed a probation agreement, agreeing to numerous 
conditions, including his payment of various fines and fees prior to the termination of his 
probation (R. 44). 
Judge Judkins ordered Mr. Grindberg released to an inpatient program on August 10, 
1996 (R. 46). 
On September 26, 1996, Judge Judkins signed an order drafted by the prosecution 
terminating Mr. Grindberg's probation. The order stated, "Upon the recommendation of 
Adult Probation and Parole, and upon the Court's review of the Defendant's probation, it 
is hereby ordered that probation is terminated." (R. 49). The order was sent to trial counsel, 
Mr. Perry, but was not sent to Mr. Grindberg (R. 49). This order is in the addendum to this 
brief. 
Subsequent to the termination of Grindberg's probation, Adult Probation and Parole 
filed an Affidavit of Probation Violation on February 20,1997, alleging that Grindberg had 
5 
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failed to report to AP&P and had failed to make payment on his fines and fees, and Judge 
Judkins issued a bench warrant and order to show cause why probation should not be 
revoked or modified (R. 50-54). 
On March 5, 1997, Grindberg appeared without counsel and pled guilty to being in 
violation of the conditions of his probation (R. 55).2 On March 24, 1997, Judge Judkins 
revoked Grindberg's probation and sent him to prison to serve the original sentences (R. 60-
62,63-64).3 
Apparently at the behest of personnel at the prison, on March 18,1998, Judge Judkins 
held a hearing and determined that the order terminating probation, dated September 26, 
1996, was entered in error, and on March 18, 1998, he entered an order rescinding and 
vacating the order terminating probation (R. 71 -72). 
At the hearing on March 18,1998, Mr. Grindberg was again represented by Mr. Perry 
(T. 3/18/1998 at 3).4 The prosecutor indicated that the order requesting termination of 
Grindberg's probation must have been drafted erroneously by his office, and signed 
2
 As of the filing of the opening brief of appellant, the transcript of the March 
5,1997 hearing has not been prepared. While the transcript of that hearing does not appear 
necessary to the appeal, out of an abundance of caution, counsel is pursuing the preparation 
of that transcript, and will request supplemental briefing should it become necessary. 
3
 At the hearing on March 24, 1997, Mr. Grindberg initially indicated that he 
desired to be represented by counsel, but then indicated that he wished to get the hearing 
over with if he was going to prison, and that he did not feel it would be at all beneficial to 
have an attorney (R. 57 at 3). 
4
 There is no record stamp or number on this transcript. 
6 
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erroneously by the court (T. 3/18/1998 at 2-4). The trial court observed that there was no 
recommendation from AP&P to support the probation termination (T. 3/18/1998 at 4). The 
prosecutor twice indicated that if the court had intended to terminate probation, there would 
have been no jurisdiction to revoke Grindberg's probation (T. 3/18/1998 at 2-4). The trial 
court indicated that he did not know why the order was drafted or signed, but surmised that 
a secretary at the prosecutor's office had erroneously prepared a termination order when Mr. 
Grindberg's supervision was transferred to Salt Lake City (T. 3/18/1998 at 5). The judge 
then indicated, 
I prepared an order that indicates that this matter was entered in error. 
Now, if the Department of Corrections down there, if they feel it appropriate, 
they can release the guy. That's out of my hands. I don't want to bind their 
hands by saying that there was an order that had been entered in error. So I'm 
going to relieve them of that order and then they can do with him whatever 
they want to at this point in time. 
(T. 3/18/1998 at 5). 
Mr. Perry did not object to the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, or to the court's entry 
of the order rescinding and vacating the prior order terminating Grindberg's probation (T. 
3/18/1998 at 1-5). 
The order subject to appeal states, 
This matter came on for hearing on March 18,1998. The Court, finds 
that the Order Terminating Probation on September 26 1996 was entered in 
error. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Order Terminating Probation is 
hereby rescinded and vacated. 
(R. 71). This order is in the addendum to this brief. 
7 
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Mr. Grindberg filed a notice of appeal from this order on March 26,1998 (R. 74-75). 
Grindberg simultaneously filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the trial court, 
(R. 76-112), and Judge Judkins struck the petition as prematurely filed until this appeal is 
disposed of (R. 150-151). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because there was no trial held, the relevant facts are those which have already been 
provided above, and are summarized here. 
The trial court revoked Mr. Grindberg's probation on March 24,1997 (R. 60-62,63-
64), after he had already signed an order terminating probation on September 26,1996 (R. 
49). The court then rescinded and vacated the order terminating Grindberg's probation, 
characterizing the termination order as some type of clerical error (T. 3/18/1998 at 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the trial court signed the order terminating Mr. Grindberg's probation, the trial 
court lost jurisdiction over the case. The trial court had no authority to enter the order 
vacating and rescinding the termination order, and this action violated the probation statute 
and Mr. Grindberg's rights to due process of law. 
The termination order was clear and unambiguous and signed by the trial court, and 
was not properly corrected as a mere clerical error. 
This Court should correct the errors which occurred below, despite the absence of 
proper objections in the trial court, because Mr. Grindberg is currently being held at the 
8 
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prison on the basis of an order entered by the trial court when the trial court had no 
jurisdiction. If necessary, the plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines may 
assist the Court in reaching the issues. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO RESCIND 
THE TERMINATION ORDER BECAUSE 
THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION 
WHEN HE TERMINATED GRINDBERG'S PROBATION. 
The trial court had full authority to terminate Mr. Grindberg's probation. See Utah 
Code Ann. §77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) ("Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion 
of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class 
A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions."). 
As the prosecutor implicitly twice recognized during the last hearing before the 
termination order was vacated and rescinded, when the trial court signed the order 
terminating probation, the trial court lost jurisdiction over Mr. Grindberg. See T. 3/18/1998 
at 2-4). 
Numerous Utah cases in analogous circumstances recognize that trial courts lose 
jurisdiction over their probationers when probation terminates before probation revocation 
or extension proceedings are commenced. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah 
1988)(court reversed probation revocation which was initiated after probation expired, 
holding that trial court's jurisdiction to revoke probation ceases with the termination of 
9 
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probation); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App. 1992)(trial court has 
jurisdiction to extend probation if probation extension proceedings commence prior to the 
termination of probation); Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 794-96 (Utah 1990)(unless 
probationer is seeking to avoid supervision, order to show cause must be filed prior to 
expiration of probation to preserve trial court's jurisdiction to revoke probation); State v. 
Reedy, 937 P.2d 152 (Utah App. 1997)(trial court maintained authority to revoke probation 
by issuing order to show cause during period of probation; particularly given the defendant's 
absconding from the jurisdiction, there was no requirement that he be served the order to 
show cause prior to termination of probation); State v. Kahl. 814 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah 
App.)(trial court maintained jurisdiction to revoke probation, where revocation proceedings 
were initiated prior to expiration of probation, where defendant fled from the jurisdiction), 
cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. Mova. 815 P.2d 1312, 1318 (Utah App. 
1991 Xefforts to revoke or extend probation, which were initiated after probation terminated 
eighteen months after its imposition, were untimely, and probation and parole were ordered 
extinguished); State v. Grate. 947 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court had no 
jurisdiction to revoke probation, which terminated before defendant was charged with 
probation violation). 
Utah Courts have consistently been strict in requiring trial courts to act within 
legislative parameters in revoking probation, and there is certainly nothing in the probation 
10 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
revocation statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1, which provides or even implies authority in 
the trial courts to revoke probation once it has terminated. See e,g. Green, supra. 
Under the foregoing precedents, the trial court's jurisdiction to revoke Mr. 
Grindberg's probation ended upon the court's signing of the order terminating probation. 
See e.g. Green. 
In revoking Grindberg's probation when the trial court had no jurisdiction, the trial 
court also violated Mr. Grindberg's rights to due process of law. See e,g. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945)(including in the list of fundamentals of due process of law 
which must be afforded in depriving one of liberty "the existence of a competent person, 
body, or agency authorized by law to determine the questions"). 
II 
THE TERMINATION ORDER 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A CLERICAL ERROR 
WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION UNDER 
UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30(b). 
At the hearing which preceded the entry of the order vacating and rescinding the 
order terminating Grindberg's probation, the trial court indicated that the order terminating 
probation was the result of some kind of clerical error (T. 3/18/1998 at 3). He also indicated 
that it would be nice if the court were to review all the court orders which came before the 
court (T. 3/18/1998 at 3), implying that the court signed the termination order without 
reviewing the matter carefully. 
11 
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Utah law on point demonstrates that the order terminating probation did not constitute 
a clerical error that was subject to correction. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) governs the correction of clerical errors in 
judgments, and provides, 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected 
by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
"A clerical error, as contradistinguished from judicial error, is not'the deliberate 
result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and determination.'" State v. Lorrah. 761 P.2d 
1388, 1389 (Utah 1988). Put another way, 
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend 
upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made in rendering 
the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. 46 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments §202. 
The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be undertaken for the 
purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties. 6A Moore's 
Federal Practice para. 60.60[1] (2d ed. 1983). Rule 60(a) is not intended to 
correct errors of a substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error is 
unilateral. The fact that an intention was subsequently found to be mistaken 
would not cause the mistake to be "clerical." 
Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984)(citation omitted).5 
5
 Lindsay is decided under rule of civil procedure 60(a), which provides, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal 
is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
12 
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The order at issue here did not involve any clerical error in the recording of the 
court's intent. It was drafted and submitted by the prosecution, and signed by the hand of 
the trial court, and simply stated, "Upon the recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole, 
and upon the Court's review of the Defendant's probation, it is hereby ordered that 
probation is terminated." (R. 49). While the trial court may have been mistaken in signing 
the order, his mistake did not constitute a clerical error. Lindsay. 
Utah appellate courts recognize that such unambiguous orders in criminal cases are 
not subj ect to later corrections which contradict the unambiguous orders. See Statev.Mova, 
815 P.2d 1312, 1317 and n.12 (Utah App. 1991)(citing State v. Dennev. 776 P.2d 91, 93 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989) for the propositions that "unambiguous 
criminal order cannot be later modified to match 'what the judge may have intended'" and 
that "[deferential review of the propriety of Rule 60(a) orders would be inappropriate,... 
if the record unambiguously expressed a judgment contrary to that stated in the Rule 60(a) 
order of clerical revision.").6 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
This Court has noted that rule 60(a) is substantially the same as Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 30(b). See State v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312, 1314 n.3 (Utah App. 1991). 
6
 In Mova. the parties briefed the issue under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(a). The Mova Court recognized that the civil rule is "nearly textually identical to" Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30(b), which would have been the more appropriate rule to argue in Moya, a 
criminal case. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312 at 1314 n.3. Because the Court found the substantive 
sentence improper in Mova, the Court found that review under either rule would end in the 
same result. Id. 
13 
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Because the order terminating probation did not involve clerical error, the trial court 
had no authority vacating or rescinding the order. ELg. Mova. 
Ill 
THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT THE ERRORS 
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIONS 
IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
While it is certainly true that Mr. Grindberg pled guilty to being in violation of his 
probation after his probation was terminated by the trial court (R. 55), his actions in so doing 
should not be viewed as a waiver of the unrecognized flaw in the trial court's authority to 
revoke probation, because jurisdictional issues are not subject to waiver. See State ex rel. 
E.G.T.. 808 P.2d 138, (Utah App. 1991)("[A] jurisdictional defect cannot be waived."); 
James v. Galetka. 965 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1998)("Jurisdiction of the subject matter is 
derived from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. 
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may be urged at any stage 
of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is never waived."). Cf. State v. 
Jennings. 875 P.2d 566, 567 n.l (Utah 1994)(entry of guilty plea results in waiver of all 
non-jurisdictional pre-plea issues). 
If necessary, the Court may rely on the plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel doctrines in reaching the issues. 
To warrant relief under the plain error doctrine, Grindberg must show that the trial 
court's error should have been plain at the time that it was made, and that the error affected 
Grindberg's substantial rights. See e^g. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert. 
14 
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denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). The first requirement, that the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court, can be dispensed with by this Court, to insure that justice is done. 773 P.2d 
at35n.8. 
The trial court's error in signing the order rescinding and vacating the order 
terminating probation should certainly have been plain to him, for the law indicating that his 
jurisdiction over the case ended when the probation terminated was abundantly clear at the 
time of the trial court's action in March of 1998. See See State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462, 
465 (Utah 1988); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App. 1992; Smith v. Cook. 
803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990); State v. Reedv. 937 P.2d 152 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Kahl. 
814 P.2d 1151,1153 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992); State v. Mova. 
815 P.2d 1312.1318 (Utah App. 199H: and State v. Grate. 947 P.2d 1161.1168 (Utah App. 
1997), supra. 
The trial court should have been aware of this law, particularly given that the 
prosecutor twice indicated at the hearing regarding the termination order that if the court had 
intended to terminate probation, there would have been no jurisdiction to revoke 
Grindberg's probation (T. 5/18/1998 at 2-4). 
The law indicating that judicial mistakes are not subject to correction as clerical errors 
was also abundantly clear at the time of the trial court's order in March of 1998. See State 
v. Lorrah. 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988); Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 
15 
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1984); State v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312,1317 andn.l 2 (UtahApp. 1991): and State v.Dennev. 
776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah App.), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989), supra. 
The trial court's error certainly affected Grindberg's substantial rights, for in the 
absence of the order, the order terminating Grindberg's probation would be in full force and 
effect, and Grindberg would not be in prison as a result of the probation revocation which 
occurred after the termination. 
The relevant standards governing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim are set 
forth in State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), as follows: 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must (i) identify 
specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or omission and 
under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel' s error 
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for the error, there is a reasonable 
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant. 
This prejudice test is equivalent to the harmfulness test we apply in 
determining plain error, or reversible error. 
In determining whether counsel' s performance is constitutionally deficient, we 
presume that counsel has rendered adequate assistance. Thus, if the challenged 
act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, we will not find that 
it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel. Moreover, when confronted with a 
claim of ineffective assistance, we may choose not to consider the adequacy 
of counsel's performance if we determine that any claimed error was not 
harmful. 
Id. at 1225 (citations omitted). 
Trial counsel should have informed Mr. Grindberg of the court's order terminating 
his probation. See e.g. Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 (" (a) A lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
16 
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requests for information."). It was certainly objectively deficient performance for trial 
counsel to fail to object to the trial court's entry of the order rescinding and vacating the 
order terminating Grindberg's probation, when the order terminating the probation also 
terminated the trial court's jurisdiction and fundamental authority to continue the 
imprisonment of Mr. Grindberg. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. "The Defense 
Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & Supp. 1986)(trial attorneys have the obligation to make 
proper objections and motions to protect the rights of the accused). See also e.g. Green. 
supra. 
This conduct was prejudicial, resulting in the imprisonment of Mr. Grindberg, despite 
the absence of a proper jurisdictional basis for the order revoking Grindberg's probation and 
imposing the sentence of imprisonment. See e ^ Green, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order rescinding and vacating the order 
terminating Mr. Grindberg's probation, and should order Mr. Grindberg's probation 
terminated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J?<?L day of March 1999. 
-7 
CANDICE A. J O H h ^ N ^^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C J . S . — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <$=> 82; 
Weapons <s= 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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12TH DOCUMENT of Level 1 printed in FULL format. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, 
a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. 
All rights reserved. 
*** THIS SECTION CURRENT THROUGH THE 19 98 SUPPLEMENT *** 
*** (1998 GENERAL SESSION) *** 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 18. THE JUDGMENT 
Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
@ 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence -- Pleas held in abeyance -- Probation --
Supervision -- Presentence investigation -- Standards -- Confidentiality --
Terms and conditions -- Restitution -- Termination, revocation, modification, or 
extension -- Hearings -- Electronic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or 
conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or 
execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place 
the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has continuing 
jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence 
investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
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Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to 
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3) (a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation 
of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence 
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or information from other sources about 
the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's 
family. The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of complete 
restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a 
recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered 
restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result 
of the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense 
upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the trial court's 
sentencing determination. 
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Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific 
statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant 
in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) . 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are 
protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing 
as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to 
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not 
been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be 
brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report 
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the 
record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence 
investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant: 
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, 
including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
services; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGE 5 
Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own 
expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or 
vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse 
fines, restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and 
any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with 
Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation 
period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed costs, the court 
may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench 
probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of 
enforcing the payment of fines, restitution, including interest, if any, in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, 
the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should 
not be treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term 
should not be imposed. 
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation progress 
report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, restitution, and 
other amounts outstanding. 
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Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term 
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward 
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions 
of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the 
court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of 
a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause 
to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to 
be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him 
if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by 
the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
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Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in 
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and 
malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the 
state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving 
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14). 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 
and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a 
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of 
sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence 
investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the 
offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that 
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on 
the victim or the victim's household. 
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Utah Code Ann. @ 77-18-1 (1998) 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to 
the department in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, 
it may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it 
shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on 
the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be 
indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this 
section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, @ 2; 1981, ch. 59, @ 2; 
1982, ch. 9, @ 1; 1983, ch. 47, @ 1; 1983, ch. 68, @ 1; 1983, ch. 85, @ 2; 1984, 
ch. 20, @ 1; 1985, ch. 212, @ 17; 1985, ch. 229, @ 1; 1987, ch. 114, @ 1; 1989, 
ch. 226, @ 1; 1990, ch. 134, @ 2; 1991, ch. 66, @ 5; 1991, ch. 206, @ 6; 1992, 
ch. 14, @ 3; 1993, ch. 82, @ 7; 1993, ch. 220, @ 3; 1994, ch. 13, @ 24; 1994, 
ch. 198, @ 1; 1994, ch. 230, @ 1; 1995, ch. 20, ® 146; 1995, ch. 117, @ 2; 1995, 
ch. 184, @ 1; 1995, ch. 301, @ 3; 1995, ch. 337, ® 11; 1995, ch. 352, @ 6; 1996, 
ch. 79, @ 103; 1997, ch. 392, @ 2; 1998, ch. 94, ® 10. 
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NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective May 3, 1993, added 
Subsection (2) and redesignated former Subsections (2) through (13) as 
Subsections (3) through (14). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective May 3, 1993, added "and any other 
costs assessed under Section 64-13-21" in Subsection (8), substituted "owes" for 
"has" and "or other assessed costs" for "owing" and added "and other amounts 
outstanding" in Subsection (9)(a)(ii), substituted "and other amounts 
outstanding" for "orders" in Subsection (9)(b), and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 13, effective May 2, 1994 substituted "Board of 
Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons" in Subsections (1)(c) and (4)(b); 
substituted "Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance" for "Sections 77-2a-l 
through 77-2a-4" in Subsection (2); substituted "Subsection (4)(a)" for 
"Subsection (a)" in Subsection (4)(d); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 198, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsection 
(6)(a)(ii), renumbering former Subsections (6)(a)(ii) and (iii) as (iii) and 
(iv), and made a stylistic change. 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 230, effective May 2, 1994, deleted former 
Subsection (1) which defined "confidential"; inserted "and Parole" in Subsection 
(3)(b); added Subsection (6); designated former Subsection (6)(b) as Subsection 
(7); deleted former Subsection (6)(c) pertaining to the disposition of the 
presentence investigation report after the sentencing; deleted former Subsection 
(14), relating to disclosure of presentence diagnostic evaluation and 
investigation reports; added Subsection (15); and made related and other 
stylistic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Subsections 
76-3-201(4) and (5)" for "Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4)" in Subsection (8)(i) 
and replaced "Chapter 1" with "Chapter 2" in Subsection (15). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective May 1, 1995, added references to 
"interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in Subsections (5)(c), 
(8)(i), (9)(a), (10)(a)(ii), and (13), deleted a reference to Subsection 
76-3-201(3) in Subsection (8)(i), corrected a reference in Subsection (15), and 
made stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 184, effective May 1, 1995, deleted a requirement 
of a "recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of 
restitution by the defendant" in Subsection (5)(b)(ii); rewrote Subsection (6), 
making significant stylistic changes, decreasing the time that the presentence 
investigation must be available before trial., which had been ten days, and 
adding the possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccuracies in the 
report; and added "and disbursement" after "collection" in Subsection (9)(a). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "the 
recommended amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary damages," inserted 
"as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered" in 
Subsection (5)(a) and rewrote Subsection (9). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective May 1, 1995, added "which may 
include the use of electronic monitoring" at the end of Subsection (8)(f), added 
Subsections (16) and (17), and corrected a statutory reference in Subsection 
(15) . 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 352, effective May 1, 1995, inserted "if the 
defendant is not represented by counsel" in the first sentence of Subsection 
(6), substituted "protected" for "private" and "Chapter (2)" for "Chapter (1)". 
in the first sentence of Subsection (15), added Subsection (15)(e), and made 
related stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, substituted "protected" for 
"confidential" in Subsection (5)(d). 
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The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided Subsection (8), made 
related designation changes, and added Subsection (8)(b). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "compensatory" for 
"community" twice in Subsection (8)(a)(vii), and made minor stylistic changes in 
Subsections (8) (b) (ii) and (14) (c) . 
COMPILER'S NOTES. --Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6 proposed amending Utah Const., Art. I, 
Sec. 12 and proposed adding a new Sec. 28 to that article. These proposals were 
approved by the voters, the changes to take effect on January 1, 1995. Laws 
1994, ch. 198, which amended this section to add the requirement of a victim 
impact statement, provides in @ 16 that the Legislature intends the act to serve 
as the implementing legislation of those constitutional amendments. 
COORDINATION CLAUSE. --Laws 1995, ch. 184, @ 5 directs that the amendments in 
that act to Subsection (6)(a) of this section shall supersede the amendments to 
the sme subsection in L. 1995, ch. 352. 
Laws 1995, ch. 3 01, @ 6 provides that the amendments in that act to 
Subsections (5)(b)(ii) and (9)(a) supersede the amendments to the same 
subsections by ch. 184. 
SEVERABILITY CLAUSES. --Section 3 of Laws 1983, Chapter 85 provided: "If any 
provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application." 
CROSS-REFERENCES. --Indecent public display, incarceration without suspension of 
sentence, @ 76-10-1228. 
Payment of costs of defense as condition of probation or suspension, @ 
77-32a-6. 
Presentence investigation reports, Rules 4-607, 6-301, Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing and probation proceedings, Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 1101. 
Voluntary commitment to Division of Mental Health, @ 62A-12-228(3). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Disclosure to defendant. 
-- Communications between judge and probation officer. 
-- Presentence report. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Due process. 
Extension of probation. 
-- Notice of hearing. 
Habeas corpus. 
Presentence reports. 
Restitution. 
-- Death of defendant. 
Revocation of probation. 
-- Grounds. 
-- Waiver of counsel. 
-- Nature of proceeding. 
-- Nature of violation. 
-- Notice of grounds. 
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447 (Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 R2d App. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329 
1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); PDQ 
Shields, 882 P2d 650 (Utah 1994); Commercial Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P2d 792 (Utah Ct. 
Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
' C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
 civil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 119 L
 v e r d i c t ? o r s e c u n n e w t r i a l o r r e v e r s a l o n 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion ,
 3 g A L R 4 t h 1 1 7 0 
or comments by judge as to compromise or Z . . , , . ,. , . 
settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. . J ^ . \ n a * ™ r ** ^ d m g ° n l a t e r S t a t e 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits C1V^ t n a 1 ' 4 8 A-L Rf t h ^ 7 . 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil C o u r t ^por ters death or disability prior to 
case 7 A L R 3d 1000 transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
Quotient'verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. n e w t r i a l> 5 7 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc- . Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
tions in civil case as affected by the mariner in a l o n e n e w t r i a l granted on ground of inade-
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. °luacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by ^75. 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre- After-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
mises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ac-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference tion for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699. 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 damages for personal injury to or death of 
A.L.R.3d 1101. seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in ages for personal injury or death in actions 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 USCS §§ 51etseq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. 
A.L.R.3d 126. Fed. 189. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
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was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action." This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
flict with rules permitting service by means 
other than personal service. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above, and renum-
bered the grounds accordingly. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F R C P . 
No claim for relief. 
— Delayed motion for new trial. 
— Factual error. 
— Failure to file cost bill. 
— Failure to file notice of appeal. 
— Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
— Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
— Burden of proof. 
— Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
— Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
— Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
— Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
— Erroneously included damages. 
— Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
— Confused mental condition of party. 
— Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
— Fraud. 
— Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
— Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
— Newly discovered evidence. 
— Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 
— Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
— Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
— Basis. 
— Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (b)(7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); 
second, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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available only after a judge has been assigned to the case for trial. A notice of 
change may not be filed prior to or during a preliminary examination. 
(b) Time. The notice shall be filed no later than 7 days after notice of 
assignment or reassignment of judge. Failure to file a timely notice precludes 
any change of judge under this rule. 
(c) Assignment of action. Upon the filing of a notice of change, the assigned 
judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge shall 
promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the 
action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the clerk shall 
promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice, who shall determine whether the 
notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the action. 
(d) Nondisclosure to court. No party shall communicate to the court, or 
cause another to communicate to the court, the fact of any party's seeking 
consent to a notice of change. 
(e) Rule 29 unaffected. This rule does not affect any rights under Rule 29. 
(Added effective April 15, 1992; amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 
1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment deleted "circuit" after "district" near the 
beginning of Subdivision (a). 
Compiler's Notes. — In a minute entry 
dated January 21, 1993, the Utah Supreme 
Court provided that this rule, "originally 
adopted on an emergency basis effective April 
15, 1992, has now been published for public 
comment. The Advisory Committee proposed 
amendments to paragraph (b). Those amend-
ments are adopted, effective May 1, 1993." 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Cross References. — Arraignment, neces-
sity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10. 
Indictments and informations, harmless er-
rors, U.R.Cr.P. 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
Harmless error. 
Minor defect. 
Substantial right affected. 
—State's burden of persuasion. 
Variances. 
Cited. 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Even though admission of photographs of 
manslaughter victim served only to create emo-
tional impact on jury, their admission was not 
reversible error; they were not so gruesome or 
offensive that their absence would have re-
sulted in a more favorable outcome for defen-
dant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 310 (Utah 1979). 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
The defendant's due process right of allocu-
tion was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held 
in his presence, where he was addressed by the 
judge and elected to speak, and an amended 
judgment subsequently entered by the trial 
court, at which the defendant was not present 
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a 
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence. 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988). 
Harmless error. 
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge 
of female under age of 18 years, although it was 
error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts of 
sexual intercourse after one relied on for con-
viction, such error was not prejudicial to defen-
dant so as to require reversal. State v. Mattivi, 
39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911). 
V/here defendant in murder prosecution con-
tested every step taken by state during 
progress of trial and was afforded every oppor-
tunity to defend charge, and his counsel in-
sisted upon every right to which the law enti-
tled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not 
guilty was received on legal holiday did not 
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52 
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918). 
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less in representing 
lip is terminated as pro-
a lawyer should carry 
all matters undertaken 
s employment is limited 
relationship terminates 
een resolved. If a lawyer 
r a substantial period in 
le client sometimes may 
r will continue to serve 
unless the lawyer gives 
Doubt about whether a 
lip still exists should be 
preferably in writing, so 
mistakenly suppose the 
the client's affairs when 
:o do so. For example, if 
i judicial or administra-
oduced a result adverse 
iot been specifically in-
rsuit of an appeal, the 
le client of the possibil-
lquishing responsibility 
>mparison. — DR 
lat a lawyer not "[n)e-
glect a legal matter entrusted to him." EC 6-4 
stated that a lawyer should "give appropriate 
attention to his legal work." Canon 7 stated 
that "a lawyer should represent a client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law." DR 7-
10KAX1) provided that a lawyer "shall not 
intentionally ... fail to seek the lawful objec-
tives of his client through reasonably available 
means permitted by law and the Disciplinary 
Rules ...."DR 7-101(A)(3) provided that a law-
yer "shall not intentionally ... [pjrejudice or 
damage his client during the course of the 
professional relationship 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Negligence, inattention, or professional in-
competence of attorney in handling client's af-
fairs in bankruptcy matters as ground for dis-
ciplinary action — modern cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 
786. 
Legal malpractice in handling or defending 
medical malpractice claim, 78 A.L.R.4th 725. 
A.L.R. — Negligence, inattention, or profes-
sional incompetence of attorney in handling 
client's affairs in personal injury or property 
damage actions as ground for disciplinary ac-
tion — modern cases, 68 A.L.R.4th 694. 
Negligence, inattention, or professional in-
competence of attorney in handling client's af-
fairs in criminal matters as ground for disci-
plinary action — modern cases, 69 A.L.R.4th 
410. 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
Comment. — The client should have suffi-
cient information to participate intelligently in 
decisions concerning the objectives of the rep-
resentation and the means by which they are to 
be pursued, to the extent the client is willing 
and able to do so. For example, a lawyer nego-
tiating on behalf of a client should provide the 
client with facts relevant to the matter, inform 
the client of communications from another 
party and take other reasonable steps that 
permit the client to make a decision regarding a 
serious offer from another party. A lawyer who 
receives from opposing counsel an offer of set-
tlement in a civil controversy or a proffered 
plea bargain in a criminal case shall promptly 
inform the client of its substance unless prior 
discussions with the client have left it clear 
that the proposal will be unacceptable. See 
Rule 1.2(a). Even when a client delegates au-
thority to the lawyer, the client should be kept 
advised of the status of the matter. 
Adequacy of communication depends in part 
on the kind of advice or assistance involved. For 
example, in negotiations where there is time to 
explain a proposal, the lawyer should review all 
important provisions with the client before pro-
ceeding to an agreement. In litigation, a lawyer 
should explain the general strategy and pros-
pects of success and ordinarily should consult 
the client on tactics that might injure or coerce 
others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily 
cannot be expected to describe trial or negotia-
tion strategy in detail. The guiding principle is 
that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client 
expectations for information, whether written 
or oral, consistent with the duty to act in the 
client's best interest and the client's overall 
requirements as to the character of representa-
tion. 
Ordinarily, the information to be provided is 
that appropriate for a client who is a compre-
hending and responsible adult. However, fully 
informing the client according to this standard 
may be impracticable, for example, where the 
client is a child or suffers from mental disabil-
ity. When the client is an organization or group, 
it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform 
every one of its members about its legal affairs; 
ordinarily, the lawyer should address commu-
nications to the appropriate officials of the 
organization. Where many routine matters are 
involved, a system of limited or occasional re-
porting may be arranged with the client. Prac-
tical exigency may also require a lawyer to act 
for a client without prior consultation. 
Withholding Information 
In some circumstances, a lawyer may be 
justified in delaying transmission of informa-
tion when the client would be likely to react 
imprudently to an immediate communication. 
Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric 
diagnosis of a client when the examining psy-
chiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm 
the client. A lawyer may not withhold informa-
tion to serve the lawyer's own interest or con-
venience. Rules or court orders governing liti-
gation may provide that information supplied 
to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. 
Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules 
or orders. 
Model Code Comparison. — Rule 1.4 has 
no direct counterpart in the Disciplinary Rules 
of the Code. DR 6-10HAX3) provided that a 
lawyer shall not "[njeglect a legal matter en-
trusted to him." DR 9-102(B)(l) provided that a 
lawyer shall "[plromptly notify a client of the 
receipt of his funds, securities, or other proper-
ties." EC 7-8 stated that a lawyer "should exert 
his best efforts to insure that decisions of his 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL LYNN GRINDBERG, 
Defendant. , 
I ORDER FOR 
) PROBATION TERMINATION 
) Case No. 961000056 
Upon the recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole, and 
upon the Court's review of the Defendant's probation, it is hereby 
ordered that probation is terminated. 
Ordg^gd^this £Q> ~~ day of September, 1996. 
J7 *O 
iJ/V% BY THE COURT: 
G-0 
ff i 
r> o 
-
:
- '-^  
•-J. " 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above was 
delivered this date to Dave Perry, Attorney for Defendant, at his 
box in District Court, Logan,, UT. 
DATED th day of Septemlje 
X Legal 
MiL UftJIA^ 
tant 
[C\:^-
ROLL NUMBER 
SEP 2 / 19% *cn 
c^ 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL LYNN GRINDBERG, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 961100056 FS 
This matter came on for hearing on March 18, 1998. The Court, finds that the 
Order Terminating Probation on September 26 1996 was entered in error. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Order Terminating Probation is hereby 
rescinded and vacated. 
DATED THIS Vt r 
U 
day of March, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
CLINT S. JU 
DISTRICT CO UDGE 
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